SCOPE:

·         Bibliographic resources relating to a no fault dissolution of marriage (divorce) commenced after October 1, 1997

DEFINITIONS:

·         No fault divorce: “A decree of dissolution of a marriage . . . shall be granted upon a finding that one of the following causes has occurred: (1) the marriage has broken down irretrievably; (2) the parties have lived apart by reason of incompatibility for a continuous period of at least the eighteen months immediately prior to the service of the complaint and that there is no reasonable prospect that they will be reconciled . . . .” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-40(c)(2008).

·         “Incompatibility of personalities is not and has never been a ground for divorce in Connecticut. Under our law, married persons are expected to accept the ordinary vicissitudes of marriage caused by unwise mating, unhappy situations, unruly tempers and common quarrels or marital wranglings.” Nowak v. Nowak, 23 Conn. Sup. 495, 497, 185 A.2d 83 (1962).

·         Irretrievable breakdown: “In 1973, by No. 73-373 of the 1973 Public Acts (P.A. 73-373), the legislature effected an historic revision of our marital dissolution statutes. That legislation introduced certain new concepts to our family law, such as the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage as a ground for dissolution.” Doe v. Doe, 244 Conn. 403, 433, 710 A.2d 1297 (1998).

·         “The determination of whether a breakdown of a marriage is irretrievable is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court.” Eversman v. Eversman, 4 Conn. App. 611, 614, 496 A.2d 210 (1985).

·         “The absence of objective guidelines does not mean an abdication of judicial function, nor does it signal, as the defendant argues, that a court determining whether a marriage has in fact irretrievably broken down is acting purely ministerially or is granting a divorce ‘upon demand.’ It does, however, sustain the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant’s decision to rearrange his business ventures after the initiation of divorce proceedings does not necessarily repair the rupture in the marital relationship that had previously occurred.” Joy v. Joy, 178 Conn. 254, 255-256, 423 A.2d 895 (1979).

STATUTES:

·         Conn. Gen. Stat. (2008).

§ 46b‑40(c). Fault and no fault grounds for divorce or legal separation

§ 46b‑51. Stipulation of parties and finding of irretrievable breakdown

COURT RULES:

·         Conn. Practice Book (2008).

Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters

§ 25-2. Complaints for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil Union, Legal Separation, or Annulment

§ 25-7. Pleadings in general; Amendments to complaint or application

§ 25-8. —Amendment; New grounds for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil Union

§ 25-9. —Answer, Cross Complaint, Claims for Relief by Defendant

§ 25-10. —Answer to Cross Complaint

CASES:

·         Embriano v. Embriano, No. FA-06 4023849 (Ct. Supp. Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford , Mar. 24, 2008). “By complaint dated June 5, 2006, the plaintiff-husband commenced this action seeking a dissolution of marriage on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown and other relief . . . . The court has considered all of the factors set out in Connecticut General Statutes Sections 46b-81, 46b-82, 46b-62 and other pertinent statutes, earnings and earning capacity differentials, causes for the breakdown of the marriage and the consequences of the financial orders set forth below.” [Emphasis added]

·         Grimm v. Grimm, 82 Conn. App. 41, 48, 844 A.2d 855 (2004). “The defendant failed to demonstrate that the court improperly found that the marriage had broken down irretrievably. The record clearly demonstrates the breakdown in the parties’ marriage. The fact that the defendant claims to maintain hope for reconciliation will not support a finding that there are prospects for reconciliation. The allegations raised by the plaintiff concerning the difficulties in the marriage were serious and spanned almost the entire length of the marriage. The court was within its discretion to credit the plaintiff’s version of the facts that the pattern of litigation was the result of the defendant’s attempt to thwart the dissolution proceedings, not the plaintiff’s lack of intent to end the marriage. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not improperly find that the marriage had broken down irretrievably.”

·         Evans v. Taylor, 67 Conn. App. 108, 115, 786 A.2d 525 (2001). “On the basis of the record, we conclude that the court could reasonably have found that the defendant had failed to establish her claim of intolerable cruelty, and therefore it was not clearly erroneous for the court to reject intolerable cruelty as a ground for dissolution and instead grant the dissolution of the marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown.”

·         Sweet v. Sweet, 190 Conn. 657, 659, 462 A.2d 1031 (1983). “Section 46b-51 allows the court to avoid specifying fault for the breakdown of the marriage and allows the parties to avoid calling friends or relatives to testify as to the reasons for the breakdown.”

·         Eversman v. Eversman, 4 Conn. App. 611, 614, 496 A.2d 210 (1985). “The determination of whether a breakdown of a marriage is irretrievable is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court . . . . The fact that the defendant maintains hope for reconciliation will not support a finding that there are prospects for a reconciliation . . . . A difference, to be irreconcilable, need not necessarily be so viewed by both parties.”

·         Sweet v. Sweet, 190 Conn. 657, 659-670, 462 A.2d 1031 (1983). “Section 46b-51 allows the court to avoid specifying fault for the breakdown of the marriage. . . . In contrast with 46b-51, under the statutes governing the assignment of the property of the parties or the award of alimony in a contested proceeding, the court is required to consider the causes for the dissolution of the marriage.”

·         Posada v. Posada, 179 Conn. 568, 572, 427 A.2d 406 (1980). “No-fault divorce does not mean that the causes of a marital breakup are always irrelevant, but it does mean that determining cause is not crucial to the judicial administration of matrimonial matters.”

·         Gluck v. Gluck, 181 Conn. 225, 227, 435 A.2d 35 (1980). “Next, the defendant asserts that General Statutes 46b-40(c), to the extent that it authorizes the dissolution of a marriage if the marriage has broken down irretrievably, is vague, nullifies the other grounds for dissolution, prevents defenses and impairs the obligation of contracts, all in violation of constitutional strictures. The vagueness issue was resolved in Joy v. Joy, 178 Conn. 254, 255-56, 423 A.2d 895 (1979); what was said there need not be repeated here. The gravamen of the unparticularized claim that irretrievable breakdown nullifies the other grounds for dissolution set forth in 46b-40(c) and prevents defenses appears to be that the legislature has sanctioned divorce on demand. This claim too was rejected in Joy v. Joy, supra. The notion that allowing marital dissolutions based on irretrievable breakdown impairs the obligation of contracts within the meaning of article one, 10 of the United States constitution is bankrupt. Marriage is not a contract within the meaning of this clause of the constitution. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210, 8 S.Ct. 723, 31 L.Ed. 654 (1888).”

·         Joy v. Joy, 178 Conn. 254, 256, 423 A.2d 895 (1979). “The defendant claims that 46-32(c) is unconstitutional unless this court imposes judicial standards or guidelines to limit discretionary fact-finding by the trial courts of this state. We disagree. At least since Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-14, 8 S.Ct. 723, 31 L.Ed. 654 (1888), it has been clear that the legislature has plenary power to determine the circumstances under which a marital relationship is created and terminated . . . . The legislature could rationally conclude that public policy requires an accommodation to the unfortunate reality that a marital relationship may terminate in fact without regard to the fault of either marital partner, and that such a relationship should therefore be dissoluble in law upon a judicial determination of irretrievable breakdown. Courts in other jurisdictions with similar statutes have unanimously upheld the constitutionality of no-fault divorce.”

·         McEvoy v. McEvoy, 99 Conn. 427, 421, 122 A. 100 (1923). “But there are trials causing much weariness and suffering, which parties to the marriage contract must bear; the policy of the State, as well as the sacred nature of the marriage covenant, requires patient endurance.”

WEST KEY NUMBERS:

·         Divorce #12. Causes for divorce in general

·         Divorce #34. Inability to live together

·         Divorce #36. Voluntary separation

DIGESTS:

·         Connecticut Family Law Citations: Irretrievable breakdown

·         Dowling’s Digest: Dissolution of marriage § 7

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

·         24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation (1998).

§§ 22-24. No-Fault grounds

§§ 25-34. Voluntary separation

·         27A C.J.S. Divorce (1986).

§§ 13-70. Grounds; No-Fault divorce

·         Dissolution Of Marriage On Statutory Ground Of Incompatibility, 19 POF2d 221(1979).

·         James L. Rigelhaupt, Annotation, What Constitutes “Incompatibility” Within Statute Specifying It As Substantial Ground for Divorce, 97 ALR3d 989 (1980).

·         Jack W. Short, Jr., Annotation, Validity, construction, and effect of ‘no-fault’ divorce statute providing for dissolution of marriage upon finding that relationship is no longer viable, 55 ALR3d 581 (1974).

TEXTS & TREATISES:

·         7 Arnold H. Rutkin and Kathleen A. Hogan, Connecticut Practice, Family Law and Practice with Forms (1999).

Chapter 15. Dissolution of marriage in general

§ 15.2 Breakdown of marriage relationship

§ 15.3 Constitutionality of no-fault law

§ 15.4 Other grounds for dissolution

§ 15.5 Separation for eighteen months

LAW REVIEWS:

·         Robert M. McAnernery and Samuel V. Schoommaker III, Connecticut’s New Approach To Marriage Dissolution, 47 Connecticut Bar Journal 375 (1973).

SCOPE:

·         Bibliographic resources relating to dissolution of marriage (divorce) based upon fault grounds.

DEFINITIONS:

·         Fault grounds: “A decree of dissolution of a marriage . . . shall be granted upon a finding that one of the following causes has occurred. . .(3) adultery; (4) fraudulent contract; (5) wilful desertion for one year with total neglect of duty; (6) seven years’ absence, during all of which period the absent party has not been heard from; (7) habitual intemperance; (8) intolerable cruelty; (9) sentence to imprisonment for life or the commission of any infamous crime involving a violation of conjugal duty and punishable by imprisonment for a period in excess of one year; (10) legal confinement in a hospital or hospitals or other similar institution or institutions, because of mental illness, for at least an accumulated period totaling five years within the period of six years next preceding the date of the complaint.” Conn. Gen. Stat.§46b-40(c) (2008).

STATUTES:

·         Conn. Gen. Stat. (2008).

§46b‑40(c). Fault and no fault grounds for divorce or legal separation

COURT RULES:

·         Conn. Practice Book (2008).

Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters

§ 25-2. Complaints for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil Union, Legal Separation, or Annulment

§ 25-7. Pleadings in general; Amendments to complaint or application

§ 25-8. —Amendment; New Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil Union

§ 25-9. —Answer, Cross Complaint, Claims for Relief by Defendant

§ 25-10. —Answer to Cross Complaint

CASES:

·         Turgeon v. Turgeon, 190 Conn. 269, 278, 460 A.2d 1260 (1983). “Although, because of their clandestine nature, adulterous acts are usually proved by circumstantial evidence . . . the circumstances must be such as to lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just person to the conclusion of guilt.”

·         Posado v. Posado, 179 Conn. 568, 573, 427 A.2d 406 (1980). “In the text of the statutes, the criteria relating to the ‘the causes for the . . . dissolution of marriage’ is only one item in an extensive list of criteria that the trial court is directed to take into account.”

·         Kinsley v. Kinsley, 110 Conn. 695, 695-696 (1929). “The cumulative effect of the defendant’s acts and conduct as recited in the report of the committee may well have been held to have been so cruel as to have destroyed the public and personal objects of matrimony, past rehabilitation, and rendered a continuance of the marriage relation unbearable - beyond reasonable endurance - and therefore intolerable within the meaning we have given it in the ground for divorce, ‘intolerable cruelty.’”

·         Alden v. Alden, 21 Conn. Sup. 301, 304, 154 A.2d 522 (1959). “The desertion for three years which constitutes a ground for divorce under our statute involves the coexistence of the following four conditions: (1) cessation from cohabitation, (2) an intention on the part of the absenting party not to resume it, (3) the absence of the other party’s consent, and (4) the absence of justification.”

·         Vendetto v. Vendetto, 115 Conn. 303, 305, 161 A. 392 (1932). “The plaintiff’s ground of divorce was the fraud of the defendant in entering into the marriage contract knowing her epileptic condition, and yet, in order to induce marriage, concealing the fact from the plaintiff.”

WEST KEY NUMBERS:

·         Divorce # 12-38. Grounds

DIGESTS:

·         Connecticut Family Law Citations: Fault

·         Dowling’s Digest: Dissolution of Marriage §§ 6-10

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

·         24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation (1998).

§§ 35-128. Fault grounds

·         27A C.J.S. Divorce (1986).

§§ 22-40. Cruelty

§§ 41-52. Desertion

§§ 53-59. Personal indignities

§§ 60-70. Other particular grounds

TEXTS & TREATISES:

·         7 Arnold H. Rutkin and Kathleen A. Hogan, Connecticut Practice, Family Law and Practice with Forms (1999).

Chapter 15. Dissolution of marriage in general

§ 15.6 Adultery

§ 15.7. Fraudulent contract

§ 15.8. Wilful desertion for one year

§ 15.9. Continuous absence for seven years

§ 15.10. Habitual intemperance

§ 15.11. Intolerable cruelty

§ 15.12. Imprisonment; life sentence or commission of infamous

crime

§ 15.13. Five-year confinement for mental illness

§ 15.14. Defenses

SCOPE:

·         Bibliographic resources relating to dissolution of marriage (divorce) based upon the grounds of adultery.

DEFINITIONS:

·         Adultery “means voluntary sexual intercourse between a married person and a person other than such person’s spouse.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-40(f) (2008).

STATUTES:

·         Conn. Gen. Stat. (2008)

§ 46b‑40(c). Fault and no fault grounds for divorce or legal separation.

“A decree of dissolution of a marriage . . . shall be granted upon a finding that one of the following causes has occurred . . .(3) adultery . . . .”

COURT RULES:

·         Conn. Practice Book (2008).

Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters

§ 25-2. Complaints for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil Union, Legal Separation, or Annulment

§ 25-7. Pleadings in General; Amendments to Complaint or Application

§ 25-8. —Amendment; New Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil Union

§ 25-9. —Answer, Cross Complaint, Claims for Relief by Defendant

§ 25-10. —Answer to Cross Complaint

CASES:

·         Wight v. Wight, no. 0551734 (Ct. Super. Ct., J.D. New London, October 20, 2000) 2000 WL 1705741 (Conn. Super. 2000). “Adultery as a ground for dissolution under C.G.S. § 46b-40 requires proof that the other spouse has engaged in extramarital sexual relations citing Brodsky v. Brodsky, 153 Conn. 299 (1966). The adulterous relationship must be established by a fair preponderance of evidence, again citing Brodsky.”

·         Brodsky v. Brodsky, 153 Conn. 299, 300-301, 216 A.2d 180 (1966). “Adultery, as a ground for divorce or legal separation under General Statutes 46-13 or 46-29, requires proof that the other spouse has engaged in extramarital sexual relations. 27A C.J.S., Divorce, 21; 17 Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, 34; see Schilcher v. Schilcher, 124 Conn. 445, 200 A. 351; Torlonia v. Torlonia, 108 Conn. 292, 302, 142 A. 843; Dennis v. Dennis, 68 Conn. 186, 195, 36 A. 34; Trubee v. Trubee, 41 Conn. 36, 40. A principal claim of error in the present case is that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant committed adultery with Barbara Jean Miles. Although the proof will be circumstantial in nearly every case, the plaintiff must nonetheless prove the adulterous relationship by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Zeiner v. Zeiner, 120 Conn. 161, 165, 179 A. 644. The circumstances must be such as to lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man to the conclusion of guilt. Neff v. Neff, 96 Conn. 273, 275, 114 A. 126.”

·         Charpentier v. Charpentier, 206 Conn. 150, 154, 536 A.2d 948 (1988). “The fact that a custodial parent normally bears the principal responsibility for raising and educating children, whose needs demand primary consideration, may well justify a division of family assets that would otherwise appear disproportionate and unfair. There is no basis whatever, therefore, for the claim raised by the defendant of discrimination because of sexual preference.”

·         Turgeon v. Turgeon, 190 Conn. 269, 278, 460 A.2d 1260 (1983). “Although, because of their clandestine nature, adulterous acts are usually proved by circumstantial evidence . . . the circumstances must be such as to lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just person to the conclusion of guilt . . . . The adulterous relationship must be established by a fair preponderance of the evidence.”

·         Neff v. Neff, 96 Conn. 273, 276, 114 A. 126 (1921). “in weighing the evidence of adultery, the court should exercise great care to see that it is not imposed upon through the intense interest of the parties to color the facts; it should not see evil where the circumstances may reasonably lend themselves to an innocent interpretion, nor on the other hand, should it refuse to reach that conclusion which the sound and unprejudiced judgment should lead to.”

·         Beede v. Beede, 186 Conn. 191, 196, 440 A.2d 283 (1982). “There is nothing in the record to support the defendant’s claim that the court acted punitively in making its award by focusing on the defendant’s adultery as the cause of the dissolution.”

WEST KEY NUMBERS:

·         Divorce #26. Adultery

DIGESTS:

·         Connecticut Family Law Citations: Adultery

·         Dowling’s Digest: Dissolution of Marriage § 10

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

·         24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation (1998).

§ 59. Adultery, generally

§ 60. Requirement of intent

·         27A C.J.S. Divorce (1986).

§ 60. Adultery

·         Adultery, 1 POF 237 (1959).

TEXTS & TREATISES:

·         7 Arnold H. Rutkin and Kathleen A. Hogan, Connecticut Practice, Family Law and Practice with Forms (1999).

Chapter 15 Dissolution of marriage in general

§ 15.6. Adultery

LAW REVIEWS:

·         Victor M. Gordon, Adultery As A Ground For Divorce In Connecticut, 23 Connecticut Bar Journal 315 (1949).

SCOPE:

·         Selected bibliographic resources relating to dissolution of marriage (divorce) based upon the grounds of fraudulent contract.

DEFINITIONS:

·         Fraudulent contract: “There must be a deception in respect to some fact whose existence or nonexistence may affect in some certain way the very essence of the marriage relation, resulting in a lawful marriage which practically operates as a fraud upon the deceived spouse; and the existence or nonexistence of the fact thus concealed or misrepresented must operate, as between parties to the marriage, to prevent some essential purpose of marriage and work a practical destruction of that relation.” Gould v. Gould, 78 Conn. 242, 261 (1905).

·         “In Connecticut, by statute . . . fraudulent contract is a ground for divorce. This ground probably embraces some situations which, at least in jurisdictions not having such a ground of divorce, could also support an action for annulment.” Perlstein v. Perlstein, 152 Conn. 152, 161, 204 A.2d 909 (1964).

·         “All the grounds of divorce specified, except fraudulent contract, are of such a nature that they can come into existence only after the marriage. While fraudulent conduct of a certain kind will render a marriage voidable, such fraud differs from that which vitiates ordinary contracts in that the party defrauded may not at his own election avoid the marriage, but it is held to be voidable only by a decree of the court.” Davis v. Davis, 119 Conn. 194, 196, 175 A. 574 (1934).

STATUTES:

·         Conn. Gen. Stat. (2008).

§ 46b‑40(c). Fault and no fault grounds for divorce or legal separation.

“A decree of dissolution of a marriage . . . shall be granted upon a finding that one of the following causes has occurred . . .(4) fraudulent contract . . . .”

COURT RULES:

·         Conn. Practice Book (2008).

Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters

§ 25-2. Complaints for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil Union, Legal Separation, or Annulment

§ 25-7. Pleadings in general; Amendments to Complaint or Application

§ 25-8. —Amendment; New Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil Union

§ 25-9. —Answer, Cross Complaint, Claims for Relief by Defendant

§ 25-10. —Answer to Cross Complaint

CASES:

·         Dasilva v. Dasilva, No. 02 0470290 (Ct. Super. Ct., J.D. New Haven, Apr. 21, 2003) 2003 WL 21037549 (Conn. Super. 2003). “What amounts to ‘fraudulent contract,’ as that term is used in our divorce statute, and to that or other equivalent language, as used in the law, written or unwritten, elsewhere, to express a recognized condition justifying the annulment or dissolution of a marriage, has been much discussed, but no satisfactory and comprehensive definition applicable to all situations has been arrived at or attempted to be arrived at. Gould v. Gould, 78 Conn. 242 (1905).

It is certain, however, that wherever there is a fraud on the part of one of the parties amounting to ‘a fraud in the essentialia of the marriage relation,’ or as in Gould v. Gould, supra, page 261-62, “whenever there is a ‘deception in respect to some fact whose existence or nonexistence may affect in some certain way the very essence of the marriage relation, resulting in a lawful marriage which practically operates as a fraud upon the deceived spouse, and the existence or nonexistence of the fact thus concealed or misrepresented must operate, as between the parties to the marriage, to prevent some essential purpose of marriage and work a practical destruction of that relation.”

·         Tuccio v. Tuccio, 18 Conn. Supp. 215 (1953). “. . . if the marriage was induced by fraudulent contract or representation of the epileptic as to his condition, it may be grounds for divorce on the statutory ground of fraudulent contract.”

·         Gould v. Gould, 78 Conn. 242, 250, 61 Atl. 604 (1930). “Such a fraud is accomplished whenever a person enters into that contract knowing that he is incapable of sexual intercourse, and yet, in order to induce marriage, designedly and deceitfully concealing that fact from the other party, who is ignorant of it and has no reason to suppose it to exist.”

·         McCurry v. McCurry, 126 Conn. 175, 177-178, 10 A.2d 365 (1939). “The referee refused specifically to find that the defendant entered into the marriage with the concealed intent not to consummate it or to have children and found that the plaintiff had failed to prove that allegation of the complaint. The existence of such an intent would be a question of fact; and we cannot hold that no other conclusion was reasonably possible than that she had that intent when she was married.”

·         Gordon v. Gordon, 11 Conn. Supp. 302, 302 (1942). “In order to make out fraudulent contract as a ground for divorce the facts misrepresented or concealed must be such as to go to the very essence of the marriage.”

·         Horowitz v. Horowitz, 6 Conn. Supp. 14, 16 (1938). “The false representation of a woman that she is pregnant by the man who is thereby induced to marry her is not the representation of a fact which if it does not exist prevents some essential purpose of marriage and works a practical destruction of the relationship.”

·         Wetstine v. Wetstine, 114 Conn. 7, 12, 157 A. 418 (1931). “Misrepresentation by the defendant as to her age, her name, and her nationality would not furnish a sufficient basis to dissolve a consummated marriage on that ground . . . .”

·         Lyman v. Lyman, 90 Conn. 399, 403, 97 A. 312 (1916). “In consonance with this principle, the courts are practically agreed in holding that antenuptial pregnancy by another man, if concealed by the wife from the husband, who was himself innocent of improper relations with her, is a fraud upon him justifying a divorce or annulment of the marriage, as the appropriate remedy in the jurisdiction may be.”

WEST KEY NUMBERS:

·         Divorce #18. Grounds existing at time of marriage. Fraud or duress in procuring marriage

DIGESTS:

·         Connecticut Family Law Citations: Fault

·         Dowling’s Connecticut Digest: Dissolution of marriage § 7

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

·         24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation (1998).

Fraud

§ 113. Generally

§ 114. Premarital unchasity

§ 115. Pregnancy at time of marriage

§ 116. —Effect of husband’s guilt or knowledge

Misrepresentation or concealment

§ 117. Birth or parentage of child

§ 118. Prior marriage

§ 119. Insanity or mental affliction

·         27A C.J.S. Divorce (1986).

§ 62. Fraud and duress

·         Annotation, What Constitutes Impotency As Ground For Divorce, 65 ALR2d 776 (1959).

TEXTS & TREATISES:

·         7 Arnold H. Rutkin and Kathleen A. Hogan, Connecticut Practice, Family Law and Practice with Forms (1999).

Chapter 15 Dissolution of marriage in general

§ 15.7. Fraudulent contract

SCOPE:

·         Selected bibliographic resources relating to dissolution of marriage (divorce) based upon the grounds of wilful desertion for one year with total neglect of duty.

DEFINITIONS:

·         Wilful desertion: “the wilful absenting of one party to the marriage contract from the society of the other, coupled with the intention on the part of the absenting party to live apart, in spite of the wish of the other, and not to return to cohabitation.” Casale v. Casale, 138 Conn. 490, 492, 86 A.2d 568 (1952).

·         “The elements of a cause of action on the grounds of desertion are (1) cessation from cohabitation; (2) an intention on the part of the absenting party not to resume it; (3) the absence of the other party’s consent; and (4) absence of justification.” Gannon v. Gannon, 130 Conn. 449, 450, 35 A.2d 204 (1943).

·         “When our legislature, in 1843, adopted as grounds of divorce a vinculo, ‘habitual intemperance’ and ‘intolerable cruelty,’ it used these words with their ordinary meaning, but with special reference to what had been since 1639 our settled policy in respect to divorce; i.e., marriage is a life status and should never be dissolved, unless one of the parties is guilty of conduct which in itself is a practical annulling and repudiation of the marriage covenant. Wilful desertion for such a length of time as the statute says shall conclusively prove a permanent abandonment and repudiation of all marital rights and duties, had been a ground for divorce. Following this analogy the legislature, in 1843, made grounds of divorce: intemperance so long continued that the fixed habit renders the party incapable of performing the duties of the marriage relation; and cruelty of such a nature as to be intolerable, and to render a continuance of the relation by the suffering victim impracticable.” Morehouse v. Morehouse, 70 Conn. 420, 426-427, 39 A. 516 (1898). [emphasis added]

STATUTES:

·         Conn. Gen. Stat. (2008).

§ 46b‑40. Grounds for dissolution of marriage; legal separation; annulment

(c). Fault and no fault grounds for divorce or legal separation. “A decree of dissolution of a marriage . . . shall be granted upon a finding that one of the following causes has occurred . . .(5) wilful desertion for one year with total neglect of duty . . . .”

(e). “In an action for dissolution of a marriage or a legal separation on the ground of wilful desertion for one year, with total neglect of duty, the furnishing of financial support shall not disprove total neglect of duty, in the absence of other evidence.”

COURT RULES:

·         Conn. Practice Book (2008).

Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters

§ 25-7. Pleadings in general; Amendments to Complaint or Application

§ 25-8. —Amendment; New Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil Union

§ 25-9. —Answer, Cross Complaint, Claims for Relief by Defendant

§ 25-10. —Answer to Cross Complaint

CASES:

·         Toth v. Toth , 23 Conn. Supp. 161, 178 A.2d 542 (1962). “there is no question of the validity of the ground of constructive desertion where the facts of the same fit in with the definition of wilful desertion . . . found in Connecticut cases in construing our statutes.”

·         Schick v. Schick, 17 Conn. Supp. 232, 233 (1951). “Desertion requires not only separation for the requisite period of three years but also an intent, persisting throughout that entire period, not to resume the marriage relationship. Separation alone is not the equivalent of desertion.”

·         Baccash v. Baccash, 11 Conn. Supp. 387, 389 (1942). “In order to justify a husband in leaving his wife there must be such improper conduct on her part as would defeat the essential purpose of the marriage relation or the circumstances must be such that he has good reason to believe that cohabitation cannot longer be continued with due regard to this health, or safety, or that the conditions of his marital life have become intolerable.”

·         McCurry v. McCurry , 126 Conn. 175, 178, 10 A.2d 365 (1940). “By the weight of authority refusal of marital intercourse is not in itself desertion, but becomes so only when coupled with a substantial abandonment of other marital duties.”

·         Holden v. Holden, 4 Conn. Sup. 499, 499 (1937). “The question to be answered by this memorandum is whether the fact that the defendant voluntarily contributed to his wife’s support from the time of his departure from their home to the date of the trial of this action is a bar to a decree in favor of the plaintiff wife on the ground of desertion.”

WEST KEY NUMBERS:

·         Divorce #37. Desertion or absence

DIGESTS:

·         Connecticut Family Law Citations: Fault

·         Dowling’s Connecticut Digest: Dissolution of Marriage § 8

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

·         24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation (1998).

Desertion

§§ 61-73. In general

Justification for separation; constructive desertion

§§ 74-76. In general

§§ 77-85. Acts or conduct constituting constructive desertion

§§ 86-92. Offer of reconciliation

·         27A C.J.S. Divorce (1986).

§§ 41-52. Desertion

·         Annotation, Written Separation Agreement As Bar To Divorce On Grounds Of Desertion, 34 ALR2d 954 (1954).

TEXTS & TREATISES:

·         7 Arnold H. Rutkin and Kathleen A. Hogan, Connecticut Practice, Family Law and Practice with Forms (1999).

Chapter 15 Dissolution of marriage in general

§ 15.8. Wilful desertion for one year

STATUTES:

·         Conn. Gen. Stat. (2008).

§ 46b‑40(c). Fault and no fault grounds for divorce or legal separation.

“A decree of dissolution of a marriage . . . shall be granted upon a finding that one of the following causes has occurred . . . (6) seven years’ absence, during all of which period the absent part has not been heard from . . . .”

COURT RULES:

·         Conn. Practice Book (2008).

Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters

§ 25-7. Pleadings in general; Amendments to Complaint or Application

§ 25-8. —Amendment; New Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil Union

§ 25-9. —Answer, Cross Complaint, Claims for Relief by Defendant

§ 25-10. —Answer to Cross Complaint

CASES:

·         Cikora v. Cikora, 133 Conn. 456, 457, 52 A.2d 310 (1947). “This action for divorce was brought on two grounds: desertion, and seven years’ absence, during all of which period the absent party had not been heard from.”

Even where a defendant has gone to parts unknown, very likely outside the State, it may well be that publication in the place of the former marital residence is the form of notice most apt to bring the pendency of the action to his attention, because of the likelihood that there will be relatives or friends there who have means of communicating information to him directly or indirectly. The trial court was in error in striking the case from the docket on the ground that it was without jurisdiction to try the case.” p. 462

WEST KEY NUMBERS:

·         Divorce #37. Desertion or absence

DIGESTS:

·         Connecticut Family Law Citations: Fault

·         Dowling’s Connecticut Digest: Dissolution of Marriage #7

TEXTS & TREATISES:

·         7 Arnold H. Rutkin and Kathleen A. Hogan, Connecticut Practice, Family Law and Practice with Forms (1999).

Chapter 15. Dissolution of marriage in general

§ 15.9. Continuous absence for seven years

SCOPE:

·         Selected bibliographic resources relating to dissolution of marriage (divorce) based upon grounds of habitual intemperance.

DEFINITIONS:

·         “When our legislature, in 1843, adopted as grounds of divorce a vinculo, ‘habitual intemperance’ and ‘intolerable cruelty,’ it used these words with their ordinary meaning, but with special reference to what had been since 1639 our settled policy in respect to divorce; i.e., marriage is a life status and should never be dissolved, unless one of the parties is guilty of conduct which in itself is a practical annulling and repudiation of the marriage covenant. Wilful desertion for such a length of time as the statute says shall conclusively prove a permanent abandonment and repudiation of all marital rights and duties, had been a ground for divorce. Following this analogy the legislature, in 1843, made grounds of divorce: intemperance so long continued that the fixed habit renders the party incapable of performing the duties of the marriage relation; and cruelty of such a nature as to be intolerable, and to render a continuance of the relation by the suffering victim impracticable.” Morehouse v. Morehouse, 70 Conn. 420, 426-427, 39 A. 516 (1898). [emphasis added]

STATUTES:

·         Conn. Gen. Stat. (2008).

§46b‑40(c). Fault and no fault grounds for divorce or legal separation.

“A decree of dissolution of a marriage . . . shall be granted upon a finding that one of the following causes has occurred . . .(7) habitual intemperance . . . .”

COURT RULES:

·         Conn. Practice Book (2008).

Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters

§ 25-7. Pleadings in general; Amendments to Complaint or Application

§ 25-8. —Amendment; New Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil Union

§ 25-9. —Answer, Cross Complaint, Claims for Relief by Defendant

§ 25-10. —Answer to Cross Complaint

CASES:

·         Dyke v. Dyke, No. FA 01 0187101S (Conn. Super. Ct., J.D. Stamford, Feb. 10, 2005). “Very little was offered by either party regarding the imbibing habits of the defendant in his use of alcoholic beverage. There was no claim that it interfered with his ability to work as was required by ‘habitual intemperance’” (Sec. 46b-40(c)(7)).”

·         Welch v. Welch, No. FA 00-0072505 (Ct. Super. J.D. Tolland, May 17, 2002), 2002 WL 1332028 (Conn. Super. 2002). “The case law regarding what facts the court must find in order to conclude that a divorce should be granted on the grounds of habitual intemperance are sparse. However, in Dennis v. Dennis, 68 Conn. 186, 192-194 (1896), the court held that in order to establish habitual intemperance as a grounds for a divorce, it must be established that the habit’ was so gross or so long continued as to produce suffering or want in the family. Excessive indulgence in alcohol is not sufficient.”

·         Fagan v. Fagan, 131 Conn. 688, 689, 42 A.2d 41 (1945). “A detailed rehearsal of the marital difficulties of these parties would serve no useful purpose. The trial court concluded that the plaintiff was both intolerably cruel and habitually intemperate to the point that the public and personal objects of matrimony have been destroyed beyond rehabilitation, and that the custody of the minor child of the marriage should be awarded to the defendant.”

·         Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, 13 Conn. Sup. 270, 271 (1945). “He also frequently indulged to excess in alcoholic liquor. This indulgence, however, was not such as to cause any want to the family or suffering, except as it was reflected in the intolerable cruelty. For that reason his habitual intemperance was not such as to provide a ground for divorce independently of the intolerable cruelty.”

·         Hickey v. Hickey, 8 Conn. Supp. 445, 446 (1940). “In order to constitute a ground for divorce habitual intemperance must be such that it produces at some substantial suffering and does material harm to the marriage relationship.”

·         Purcell v. Purcell, 101 Conn. 422, 425 (1924). “The subordinate facts found as to intoxication, as set forth in the statement of facts, do not disclose that the defendant’s use of intoxicants was so gross as to produce want or suffering in the family, either objective or subjective, to a degree which could not reasonably be borne, or which disqualified the defendant from attending to his business; under these circumstances, the conclusion that the subordinate facts did not establish habitual intemperance, cannot be held to be illegal or illogical . . . .”

·         Dennis v. Dennis, 68 Conn. 186, 192 (1896). “Habitual intemperance as a cause for which a divorce might be granted, was first named in this State by a statute enacted in 1843, where it was coupled with intolerable cruelty. Precisely what constitutes intemperance within the meaning of that statute, it is not easy to easy to define. It may however be safely assumed that the purpose of the Act was not primarily to promote temperance or to reform the offender, but to preserve the peace, comfort, safety, happiness and prosperty, of the non-offending party, and of the family of which they are together the members and parents.”

WEST KEY NUMBERS:

·         Divorce #22. Habitual drunkenness

#27(15). Cruelty. Habitual drunkenness or use of opiates or narcotics as cruelty

DIGESTS:

·         Connecticut Family Law Citations: Fault

·         Dowling’s Connecticut Digest: Dissolution of Marriage § 7

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

·         24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation (1998).

§§ 96-100. Habitual drunkenness or drug addition

·         27A C.J.S. Divorce (1986).

§ 39. Habitual intemperance or use of narcotics

§ 57. Personal indignities. Particular acts, conduct and condition. Drunkenness and use of drugs

TEXTS & TREATISES:

·         7 Arnold H. Rutkin and Kathleen A. Hogan, 7Connecticut Practice, Family Law and Practice with Forms (1999).

Chapter 15 Dissolution of marriage in general

§ 15.10. Habitual intemperance

SCOPE:

·         Selected bibliographic resources relating to dissolution of marriage (divorce) based upon the grounds of intolerable cruelty.

DEFINITIONS:

·         Intolerable cruelty “The term ‘intolerable cruelty’ as used in our statute involves two distinct elements, and the acts which are claimed to constitute it must be, either singly or in combination, not only cruel but intolerable.” Swist v. Swist, 107 Conn. 484, 489 (1928).

·         Nowak v. Nowak, 23 Conn. Sup. 495, 497, 185 A.2d 83 (1962). “Incompatibility of personalities is not and has never been a ground for divorce in Connecticut. Under our law, married persons are expected to accept the ordinary vicissitudes of marriage caused by unwise mating, unhappy situations, unruly tempers and common quarrels or marital wranglings. To constitute intolerable cruelty, the consequences must be serious.”

·         “When our legislature, in 1843, adopted as grounds of divorce a vinculo, ‘habitual intemperance’ and ‘intolerable cruelty,’ it used these words with their ordinary meaning, but with special reference to what had been since 1639 our settled policy in respect to divorce; i.e., marriage is a life status and should never be dissolved, unless one of the parties is guilty of conduct which in itself is a practical annulling and repudiation of the marriage covenant. Wilful desertion for such a length of time as the statute says shall conclusively prove a permanent abandonment and repudiation of all marital rights and duties, had been a ground for divorce. Following this analogy the legislature, in 1843, made grounds of divorce: intemperance so long continued that the fixed habit renders the party incapable of performing the duties of the marriage relation; and cruelty of such a nature as to be intolerable, and to render a continuance of the relation by the suffering victim impracticable.” Morehouse v. Morehouse, 70 Conn. 420, 426-427, 39 A. 516 (1898). [emphasis added]

STATUTES:

·         Conn. Gen. Stat. (2008).

§46b‑40(c). Fault and no fault grounds for divorce or legal separation.

“A decree of dissolution of a marriage . . . shall be granted upon a finding that one of the following causes has occurred . . .(8) intolerable cruelty . . . .”

COURT RULES:

·         Conn. Practice Book (2008).

Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters

§ 25-7. Pleadings in general; Amendments to Complaint or Application

§ 25-8. —Amendment; New Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil Union

§ 25-9. —Answer, Cross Complaint, Claims for Relief by Defendant

§ 25-10. —Answer to Cross Complaint

CASES:

·         Evans v. Taylor, 67 Conn. App. 108, 115, 786 A.2d 525 (2001). “In its memorandum of decision, the court noted, on the basis of the testimony of the parties, that the marriage of the parties was troubled from the start and that each party believed that he or she was mistreated by the other. It also noted that although the defendant claimed that the plaintiff’s treatment of her over the course of their seven year marriage was intolerable, she tolerated it by not moving from the marital home until her husband filed an action for dissolution, despite the fact that she had the financial means to do so. Finally, the court noted that some of the difficulties in what was a stormy marriage, arose from the verbal abuse by the defendant toward the plaintiff. On the basis of those observations, the court stated that the defendant failed to prove her claim of intolerable cruelty.”

·         Garrison v. Garrison, 190 Conn. 173, 180-181, 460 A.2d 945 (1983). “The trial court’s finding that the behavior of the defendant constituted a continuing course of conduct is clearly supported by the record. In cases like the one before us, it would be archaic and absurd to hold that the plaintiff was under an obligation to be beaten more often in order to establish a continuing course of conduct. The facts found indicate that the defendant’s attitude toward the plaintiff had become indifferent and uncaring for months before the striking incidents. He was at times openly hostile and cruel, as when he confronted the plaintiff with his own adultery. He had struck her twice, for no apparent reason. In this atmosphere, a person in the plaintiff’s position could reasonably believe that the physical abuse would either continue or escalate. It would thereafter be reasonable to consider that the continuation of the marital relationship would be unbearable. The trial court did not err, but reasonably concluded that the defendant’s actions constituted intolerable cruelty.”

·         Richards v. Richards, 153 Conn. 407, 409, 216 A.2d 822 (1966). “Whether intolerable cruelty exists or not in a particular case is ordinarily a conclusion of fact for the trier to draw. Where not so drawn, it is only in exceptionally aggravated cases, where the mere statement of the evidential facts demonstrates the intolerable character of the defendant’s alleged cruelty, that this court is warranted in treating that fact as established.”

·         Bloomfield v. Bloomfield, 144 Conn. 568, 568-69, 135 A.2d 736 (1957). “There must be not only proof of acts of cruelty on the part of the defendant but also proof that in their cumulative effect upon the plaintiff they are intolerable in the sense of rendering the continuance of marital relation unbearable.”

·         Nowak v. Nowak, 23 Conn. Supp. 495, 498. 185 A.2d 83 (1962). “Our courts have never adopted the policy, which some jurisdictions have followed, ‘of comparative guilt.’”

·         Vanguilder v. Vanguilder, 100 Conn. 1, 3, 122 A. 719 (1923). “It is enough to repeat that, as the phrase imports, intolerable cruelty has a subjective as well as an objective significance. There must not only be proof of acts of cruelty has on the part of the defendant, but proof that in their cumulative effect upon the plaintiff they are intolerable in the sense of rendering the continuance of the marital relation unbearable by him.”

WEST KEY NUMBERS:

·         Divorce #27. Cruelty

DIGESTS:

·         Connecticut Family Law Citations: Cruelty

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

·         24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation (1998).

§§ 35-58. Cruelty

·         27A C.J.S. Divorce (1986).

§§ 22-40. Cruelty

·         Mental Cruelty, 21 POF 191 (1968).

TEXTS & TREATISES:

·         7 Arnold H. Rutkin and Kathleen A. Hogan, Connecticut Practice, Family Law and Practice with Forms (1999).

Chapter 15. Dissolution of marriage in general

§ 15.11. Intolerable cruelty

LAW REVIEWS:

·         Victor M. Gordon, Intolerable Cruelty As A Ground For Divorce In Connecticut, 21 Connecticut Bar Journal 64 (1947).

SCOPE:

·         Selected bibliographic resources relating to dissolution of marriage (divorce) based upon grounds of sentence to imprisonment for life or the commission of any infamous crime involving a violation of conjugal duty and punishable by imprisonment for a period in excess of one year.

DEFINITIONS:

·        “ . . . the three essentials to a divorce upon the grounds this ground are: (1) the commission by the defendant of an infamous crime, (2) involving a violation of conjugal duty, and (3) punishable by imprisonment in the state prison.” Swanson v. Swanson, 128 Conn. 128, 129, 20 A.2d 617 (1941).

STATUTES:

·         Conn. Gen. Stat. (2008).

§46b‑40(c). Fault and no fault grounds for divorce or legal separation.

“A decree of dissolution of a marriage . . . shall be granted upon a finding that one of the following causes has occurred . . .(9) sentence to imprisonment for life or the commission of any infamous crime involving a violation of conjugal duty and punishable by imprisonment for a period in excess of one year . . . .”

COURT RULES:

·         Conn. Practice Book (2008).

Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters

§ 25-7. Pleadings in general; Amendments to Complaint or Application

§ 25-8. —Amendment; New Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil Union

§ 25-9. —Answer, Cross Complaint, Claims for Relief by Defendant

§ 25-10. —Answer to Cross Complaint

CASES:

·         Cugini v. Cugini, 13 Conn. App. 632, 636, 538 A.2d 1060 (1988). “The defendant also claims an abuse of discretion by the trial court in permitting an amendment to the complaint to allege as an additional ground for dissolution that he had been convicted of an infamous crime. This is one of the grounds upon which dissolution may be sought; General Statutes 46b-40(c)(9); and, in any event, it was not the ground upon which dissolution was granted in this case.”

·         Sweet v. Sweet, 21 Conn. Supp. 198, 202, 151 A.2d 350 (1957). “From the broad range of the crime as above described, it is apparent that while there might be acts which would violate the statute and at the same time be a violation of conjugal duty, it is, nevertheless, equally true that there might be many violations of the statute which would not amount to a violation of conjugal duty. In fact, acts which might impair the morals of a child as alleged in the information here involved would not necessarily be acts in violation of conjugal duty.”

·         Donovan v. Donovan, 14 Conn. Supp. 429, 430 (1947). “. . . the conviction of an indecent assault upon a minor female is conviction of an infamous crime involving breaching of conjugal duty.”

·         Swanson v. Swanson, 128 Conn. 128, 130-131, 20 A.2d 617 (1941). “It is our conclusion that the defendant’s conviction of assault with intent to commit rape established the commission by him of an infamous crime involving a violation of conjugal duty and punishable by imprisonment in the state prison . . . .”

WEST KEY NUMBER:

·         Divorce #24. Person infirmities and conditins arising after marriage. Conviction and imprisonment for crime

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

·         24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation (1998).

§ 29. Necessity of voluntariness. Effect of imprisonment

§§ 93-95. Conviction of crime

·         27A C.J.S. Divorce § 61 (1986).

TEXTS & TREATISES:

·         7 Arnold H. Rutkin and Kathleen A. Hogan, Connecticut Practice Series, Family Law and Practice with Forms (1999).

Chapter 15 Dissolution of marriage in general

§ 15.12. Imprisonment; life sentence or commission of infamous crime

SCOPE:

·         Selected bibliographic resources relating to dissolution of marriage (divorce) based upon grounds of legal confinement in a hospital or hospitals or other similar institution or institutions, because of mental illness, for at least an accumulated period totaling five years within the period of six years next preceding the date of the complaint.

STATUTES:

·         Conn. Gen. Stat. (2008).

§ 46b‑40(c). Fault and no fault grounds for divorce or legal separation.

“A decree of dissolution of a marriage . . . shall be granted upon a finding that one of the following causes has occurred . . .(10) legal confinement in a hospital or hospitals or other similar institution or institutions, because of mental illness, for at least an accumulated period totaling five years within the period of six years next preceding the date of the complaint.”

COURT RULES:

·         Conn. Practice Book (2008).

Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters

§ 25-7. Pleadings in general; Amendments to Complaint or Application

§ 25-8. —Amendment; New Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil Union

§ 25-9. —Answer, Cross Complaint, Claims for Relief by Defendant

§ 25-10. —Answer to Cross Complaint

CASES:

·         Parker v. Parker, 16 Conn. Supp. 128, 130 (1949). “There has been no actual confinement of the defendant for five years prior to February 13, 1948, when the action was commenced.”

DIGESTS:

·         West Key Numbers: Divorce #26

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

·         24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation (1998).

§§ 124-128. Insanity or mental incapacity

·         27A C.J.S. Divorce § 68 (1986). Insanity or other mental incompetency

TEXTS & TREATISES:

·         7 Arnold H. Rutkin and Kathleen A. Hogan, Connecticut Practice Series, Family Law and Practice with Forms (1999).

Chapter 15 Dissolution of marriage in general

§ 15.13. Five-Year confinement for mental illness

SCOPE:

·         Selected bibliographic resources relating to dissolution of marriage (divorce) based upon multiple grounds.

STATUTES:

·         Conn. Gen. Stat. (2008).

§ 46b‑40(c). Fault and no fault grounds for divorce or legal separation

COURT RULES:

·         Conn. Practice Book (2008).

Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters

§ 25-7. Pleadings in general; Amendments to Complaint or Application

§ 25-8. —Amendment; New Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil Union

§ 25-9. —Answer, Cross Complaint, Claims for Relief by Defendant

§ 25-10. —Answer to Cross Complaint

CASES:

·         Sweet v. Sweet, 190 Conn. 657, 660, 462 A.2d 1031(1983). “The contention . . . that a determination of irretrievable breakdown precludes the court from considering the causes of the dissolution in making financial awards is erroneous.”

·         Gluck v. Gluck, 181 Conn. 225, 227, 435 A.2d 35 (1980). “Next, the defendant asserts that General Statutes 46b-40 (c), to the extent that it authorizes the dissolution of a marriage if the marriage has broken down irretrievably . . . nullifies the other grounds for dissolution . . . . The gravamen of the unparticularized claim that irretrievable breakdown nullifies the other grounds for dissolution set forth in 46b-40 (c) and prevents defenses appears to be that the legislature has sanctioned divorce on demand. This claim too was rejected in Joy v. Joy . . . .”

·         Joy v. Joy, 178 Conn. 254, 255-256, 423 A.2d 895 (1979). “The absence of objective guidelines does not mean an abdication of judicial function, nor does it signal, as the defendant argues, that a court determining whether a marriage has in fact irretrievably broken down is acting purely ministerially or is granting a divorce ‘upon demand.’ It does, however, sustain the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant’s decision to rearrange his business ventures after the initiation of divorce proceedings does not necessarily repair the rupture in the marital relationship that had previously occurred.”

·         Edge v. Commissioner Of Welfare, 34 Conn. Sup. 284, 286, 388 A.2d 1193 (1978). “ . . . although fault need not be established in dissolution of marriage actions, fault can still be an element to be raised in dissolution actions for purposes of establishing the support obligation of either spouse to the other.”

·         Christoni v. Christoni, 156 Conn. 628, 629, 239 A.2d 533 (1968). “Where more than one ground for a divorce is claimed and one alleged ground is proved, it is immaterial whether or not the additional statutory ground or grounds may also exist.”

WEST KEY NUMBERS:

·         Divorce # 12 - 38. Grounds

DIGESTS:

• Connecticut Family Law Citations: Fault

TEXTS & TREATISES:

·         7 Arnold H. Rutkin and Kathleen A. Hogan, Connecticut Practice Series, Family Law and Practice with Forms (1999).

Chapter 15. Dissolution of marriage in general

§ 15.4. Other grounds for dissolution

§ 15.14. Defenses

SCOPE:

·         Selected bibliographic resources relating to defenses to grounds for dissolution of marriage (divorce).

DEFINITIONS:

·         “The defenses of recrimination and condonation have been abolished.” Venuti v. Venuti, 185 Conn. 156, 157, 440 A.2d 878 (1981).

·         Condonation: “ the principle relied upon means only that an aggrieved spouse actually forgives and forgets.” Toolan v. Toolan, 15 Conn. Sup. 277, 277 (1948).

·         Recrimination “is generally defined as a rule or doctrine which precludes one spouse from obtaining a divorce from the other, where the spouse seeking the divorce has himself or herself been guilty of conduct which would entitle the opposite spouse to a divorce.” Courson v. Courson, 117 A.2d 850, 851, 208 Md. 171 (1955).

STATUTES:

·         Conn. Gen. Stat. (2008).

§ 46b‑40(c). Fault and no fault grounds for divorce or legal separation

§ 46b-52. Recrimination and condonation abolished.

“The defenses of recrimination and condonation to any action for dissolution of marriage or legal separation are abolished.”

COURT RULES:

·         Conn. Practice Book (2008).

Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters

CASES:

·         Dervin v. Dervin, 27 Conn. Supp. 459, 462 (1968). “That a person having property is incapable of managing his affairs and has a conservator appointed to do so in their behalf does not warrant a finding or interpretation in and of itself that such person is insane. What was said in the Dochelli [v. Dochelli] case, supra, [125 Conn. 468,] 470, applies with even greater force: ‘This does not connote insanity in the narrower sense and will not avail as a defense.”

WEST KEY NUMBERS:

·         DIVORCE

# 38.5 In general

# 39 Nonexistence or invalidity of marriage

# 40 Agreement for separation

# 41 Mistake of law

# 42 Mistake of fact

# 43 Insanity

# 44 Drunkenness

#45 Connivance

# 46 Provacation

# 47 Condonation

# 52 Recrimination

# 56 Collusion

# 57 Courts invested with jurisdiction

# 58 Jurisdiction of cause of action

# 65. Jurisdiction of the person

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

·         24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation (1998).

§§ 129-195. Defenses

·         27A C.J.S. Divorce (1986).

§§ 71-90. Defenses: circumstances precluding divorce

·         David P. Chapus, Annotation, Insanity As Defense To Divorce Or Separation Suit—Post 1950 Cases, 67 ALR4th 277 (1989).

TEXTS & TREATISES:

·         7 Arnold H. Rutkin and Kathleen A. Hogan, 7 Connecticut Practice, Family Law and Practice with Forms (1999).

Chapter 15 Dissolution of marriage in general

§ 15.2. Breakdown of marriage relationship

§ 15.14. Defenses

PERIODICALS:

·         Edward Y. O’Connell, Comment, Recrimination In Connecticut, 27 Conn. B.J. 376 (1953).

SCOPE:

·         Selected bibliographic resources relating to procedures in a dissolution of marriage (divorce) commenced after October 1, 1997

DEFINITIONS:

·         Jurisdiction: “The Superior Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all complaints seeking a decree of annulment, dissolution of a marriage or legal separation.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-42 (2005).

STATUTES:

·         Conn. Gen. Stat(2008).

Chapter 815j. Dissolution of marriage, legal separation and annulment

§ 46b‑44. Residency requirements

§ 46b‑45. Service and filing of complaint

§ 46b‑46. Notice to nonresident party

§ 46b‑53. Conciliation procedures; privileged communications.

§ 46b‑67(a). 90-day waiting period.

COURT RULES:

Conn. Practice Book (2008).

Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters

§ 25-2. Complaint for Dissolution of Marriage or Civil Union, Legal Separation . . . .

§ 25-3. Action for Custody of Minor Children

§ 25-5. Automatic Orders upon Service of Complaint or Application

§ 25-11. Order of Pleadings

§ 25-27. Motion for Contempt

§ 25-28. Order of Notice

§ 25-30. [Sworn] Statements to be filed

§ 25-49. Definitions [Uncontested, Limited Contested and Contested Matters ]

§ 25-50. Case Management

§ 25-51. When Motion for Default for Failure to Appear Does Not Apply

§ 25-52. Failure to Appear for Scheduled Disposition

§ 25-57. Affidavit concerning [custody] Children

§ 25-58. Reports of Dissolution of Marriage or Civil Union

FORMS;

Court Forms (Official)

·         JD-FM-3 Summons Family Action

·         JD-FM-158 Notice of automatic orders

·         JD-FM-75 Application for waiver of fees/appointment of counsel

·         JD-CL-44 Motion for first order of notice in dissolution of marriage action

·         JD-CL-38 Order of notice

·         JD-FM-165A Case management dates

·         JD-FM-163 Case management agreement

·         JD-FM-149 Parent education program—order, certificate and results

·         JD-FM-166 Hearing dates for uncontested divorces in Connecticut

·         VS-63 Health Department form

·         JD-FM-164 Affidavit concerning children

·         JD-FM-164A Addendum to affidavit concerning children

·         JD-FM-6 Financial affidavit

·         JD-CL-12 Appearance

Handbook of Family Forms for the Connecticut Lawyer

·         Motion for custody and support pendente lite, Form VI-C-2, p. 108

·         Motion for temporary joint custody and determination of joint custodial rights, Form VI-C-4, p. 110

·         Grandparents’ motion to intervene, Form VI-C-7, p. 114

·         Grandparents’ motion for visitation, Form VI-C-8, p. 115

·         Motion to limit visitation, Form VI-C-9, p. 116

·         Ex parte temporary injunction, Forms VII-A-6a to VII-A-6e, pp.145-150

DIGESTS:

·         West Key Numbers: Divorce

# 57-65. Jurisdiction

# 70-74. Parties

# 76-80. Process or notice

# 88-108. Pleading

# 109.1-137. Evidence

# 140-150.1. Trial or hearing

·         Connecticut family law Citations (2005)

Practice and Procedure

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

·         24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation (1998).

§§ 196-386. Practice and procedure

·         27A C.J.S. Divorce (1986).

§§ 91-305. Proceedings, trial, and judgments

TEXTS & TREATISES:

·         7 Arnold H. Rutkin and Kathleen A. Hogan, Connecticut Practice Series, Family Law and Practice with Forms (1999).

Chapter 16. Jurisdiction

Chapter 17. Parties

Chapter 18. Process

Chapter 19. Pleadings

·         State of Connecticut Judicial Branch. Do It Yourself Divorce Guide. JDP-FM-179 Rev. 5-05. and Supplement.

·         Barbara Kahn Stark et al., Friendly Divorce Guidebook for Connecticut: Planning, Negotiating and Filing Your Divorce (1998).

Chapter 12. Getting divorced: procedures and paperwork.

SCOPE:

Bibliographic resources relating to the residency requirement for:

·         filing a complaint for dissolution of marriage

·         issuing a decree dissolving a marriage

SEE ALSO:

·         § 3.2. Motion to dismiss

DEFINITIONS:

·         JURISDICTION: “is the power in a court to hear and determine the cause of action presented to it. Jurisdiction must exist in three particulars: the subject matter of the case, the parties, and the process.” Brown v. Cato, 147 Conn. 418, 422, 162 A.2d 175 (1960).

·         DOMICIL: “To constitute domicil, the residence at the place chosen for the domicil must be actual, and to the fact of residence there must be added the intention of remaining permanently; and that place is the domicil of the person in which he has voluntarily fixed his habitation, not for mere temporary or special purpose, but with present intention of making it his home, unless something which is uncertain or unexpected shall happen to induce him to adopt some other permanent home.” Mills v. Mills, 119 Conn. 612, 617, 179 A. 5 (1935).

·         RESIDENCE: “while domicile is essential to ‘final judgment’ residence alone provides jurisdiction for filing a dissolution complaint.” Sauter v. Sauter, 4 Conn. App. 581, 582, 495 A.2d 1116 (1985).

STATUTES:

·         Conn. Gen. Stat. (2008).

q       Residency requirement for filing a complaint for dissolution of marriage and for temporary relief

§ 46b-44 (a). A complaint for dissolution of a marriage or for legal separation may be filed at any time after either party has established residence in this state.

§ 46b-44 (b). Temporary relief pursuant to the complaint may be granted in accordance with sections 46b-56 and 46b-83 at any time after either party has established residence in this state.

q        Residency requirement for decree dissolving a marriage

§ 46b-44

(Make sure to consult a lawyer or check your local laws for any changes.)